¥°. ¼·Ð ÃÖ±Ù±îÁö ¿©·¯ Â÷·ÊÀÇ M&AÀÇ ÆÄ°í¸¦ °æÇèÇÏ¸é¼ »õ·ÎÀÌ µîÀåÇÏ´Â Àû´ëÀû ¸Å¼öÀü·«¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ´ëÀÀÃ¥µéÀ» °³¹ßÇØ¿Â ¿Â ¹Ì±¹¿¡¼´Â ±× Áß °¡Àå ´ëÇ¥ÀûÀ¸·Î ÀÎÁ¤µÇ°í ÀÖ´Â Æ÷ÀÌÁð ÇÊ(poison pill)* ¿ø±¤´ëÇб³ ¹ý°ú´ëÇÐ ÀüÀÓ°»ç, ¹ýÇйڻç Æ÷ÀÌÁð ÇÊ(µ¶¼ÒÁ¶Ç×)Àº Áö³ 1980³â ¹Ì±¹¿¡¼ ±â¾÷Àü¹® º¯È£»ç Martin LiptonÀÌ °³¹ßÇÑ ´ëÇ¥ÀûÀÎ Àû´ëÀû ¸Å¼ö(M&A) ¹æ¾î ¼ö´ÜÀÌ´Ù. ¹Ì±¹¿¡¼´Â Æò»ó½Ã ÁÖÁֵ鿡°Ô ¹è´ç Çü½ÄÀ¸·Î ¹ßÇàÇØ Áö±ÞÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ º¸ÅëÀÌ´Ù. ÁÖÁÖÃÑȸ ½ÂÀÎ ¾øÀÌ ÀÌ»çȸÀÇ °áÀǸ¸À¸·Îµµ °¡´ÉÇÏ´Ù. µ¶¼ÒÁ¶Ç׿¡´Â ±â¾÷ÀÌ Èí¼ö ÇÕº´µÉ °æ¿ì, ÁÖÁֵ鿡°Ô ÇÕº´±â¾÷ÀÇ ÁÖ½ÄÀ» Çæ°ª¿¡ ¸ÅÀÔÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ°Ô ÇÏ´Â 'Çø³¿À¹ö'Çü(flip-over plan), ¿ªÇÕº´µÉ ¶§ ÇÕº´±â¾÷ ÁÖ½ÄÀ» ½Î°Ô »ì ¼ö ÀÖ°Ô ÇÏ´Â 'Çø³ÀÎ'Çü(flip-in plan), ¸Å¼ö½ÃµµÀÚ°¡ ÀÏÁ¤ ºñÀ² ÀÌ»óÀÇ ÁÖ½ÄÀ» ÃëµæÇÑ °æ¿ì, ´ë»óȸ»çÀÇ ÁÖÁÖ¿¡°Ô ÀÚ½ÅÀÇ ÁÖ½ÄÀ» ÀÌ»çȸ°¡ °øÁ¤ÇÑ °¡°ÝÀ̶ó°í ÀÎÁ¤ÇÏ´Â Çö±ÝÀ̳ª 乫Áõ¼(notes) ¶Ç´Â ¿ì¼±ÁÖ¿Í ±³È¯ ¶Ç´Â ¸ÅµµÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï ÇÏ´Â back-end pillÇü µî ¿©·¯ °¡Áö ÇüÅ°¡ ÀÖ´Ù. ¿¡ dead hand Á¶Ç×À» Ãß°¡ÇÏ´Â °æ¿ì°¡ ¸¹¾ÆÁö°í ÀÖ´Ù. dead hand Á¶Ç×µéÀº Àû´ëÀû ¸Å¼öÀÎÀÌ ¼±ÀÓÇÑ »õ·Î¿î ÀÌ»çµé¿¡°Ô´Â ±× »óȯÀ» Á¦ÇÑÇÏ°í, °è¼Ó ÀÌ»ç(continuing director)µé¸¸ÀÌ »óȯÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â Æ÷ÀÌÁð ÇÊÀ» ¸¸µé¾î °ø°³¸Å¼ö¿Í À§ÀÓÀå °æÀïÀ» °áÇÕÇÑ °ø°ÝÀûÀÌ°í Àû´ëÀûÀÎ ±â¾÷¸Å¼öÀü¼ú¿¡ ´ëÇ×ÇÏ¿© À̸¦ ¹æ¾îÇس»´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù. Daniel A. Neff, The Impact of State Statutes and Continuing Director Rights Plans, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 663, 671 (1997). µû¶ó¼ ÃàÃâµÈ ÀÌ»çµéÀº ±×µéÀÇ ¡®dead hand'¸¦ °¡Áö°í °è¼Ó Áö¹è±ÇÀ» Çà»çÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. ÀÌ¿Í °°Àº dead hand ¹æ¾î´Â °æ¿µÁøÀÇ ´É·Â°ú ÁÖÁÖÀÇ ºÎ¸¦ ±Ø´ëÈÇÏ´Â À¯ÀÎÀ» »ó´çÈ÷ °ÈÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖÁö¸¸ ÁÖÁÖº¸È£¿¡´Â µ¶ÀÌ µÈ´Ù´Â ºñÆÇÀ» ¹ÞÀ» ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. Jeffrey N. Gordon, 'Just Say Never?' Poison Pills, Dead hand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffet, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 511, 551 (1997) ; Shawn C. Lese, Note: Preventing Control from the Grave: A Proposal for Judicial Treatment of Dead Hand Provisions in Poison Pills, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 2175, 2177 (1996). Àû´ëÀû ±â¾÷¸Å¼öÀÇ ¸Å¼¿î ÆÄ°í¸¦ °æÇèÇÑ ¹Ì±¹¿¡¼´Â °á°úÀûÀ¸·Î Á¤ºÎ Â÷¿ø¿¡¼ ±â¾÷¸Å¼ö¿¡ ¹Ý´ëÇÏ´Â ÀÔ¹ý»Ó¸¸ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó ±×¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¹æ¾î¼ö´ÜµéÀ» º¸´Ù ³Ð°Ô äÅÃÇÏ°Ô µÇ¾úÁö¸¸, Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Anti-takeover Measures, 39 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 4 (1995). ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¹æ¾î¼ö´ÜÀ» ³õ°í ±× Àû¹ý¼º°ú Ÿ´ç¼º¿¡ °üÇÏ¿© ¸¹Àº ³íÀïÀÌ ÀÌ·ç¾îÁö°í ÀÖ´Ù. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161,1201 (1981) (¹æ¾îÇàÀ§ ºÎÁ¤·Ð); Leo Herzel et al., Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 Corp. L. Rev. 107, 109 (1980) (¹æ¾îÇàÀ§ ±àÁ¤·Ð); Gary G. Lynch & Marc I. Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 Cornell L. Rev. 901, 902-03 (1979) (°æ¿ì¿¡ µû¶ó ´Ù¸£´Ù´Â ÁßµµÀû ÀÔÀå). ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ Æ÷ÀÌÁð ÇÊÀÇ ÃÊÁ¡Àº ȸ»ç¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© Ãæ½ÇÀǹ«¸¦ ºÎ´ãÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Â À̻簡 1) Æ÷ÀÌÁð ÇÊÀ» Çà»çÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´ÂÁö, 2) Çà»çÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù¸é ÀÌ»çÀÇ Çà»ç±ÇÇÑÀº ´©±¸·ÎºÎÅÍ ³ª¿À´ÂÁö, 3) ±×¸®°í ÀÌ»çÀÇ ±ÇÇÑ°ú ÁÖÁÖÀÇ ±ÇÇÑ°úÀÇ °ü°è´Â ¾î¶»°Ô µÇ´ÂÁö¿Í, 4) ÀÌ»çÀÇ Æ÷ÀÌÁð ÇÊ Çà»çÀÇ Àû¹ý¼ºÀº ÀÎÁ¤µÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´ÂÁöÀÇ ¹®Á¦ÀÌ´Ù. ¿ì¸®³ª¶óÀÇ °æ¿ì¿¡´Â ¾ÆÁ÷±îÁö ¹Ì±¹¿¡ ºñÇØ Àû´ëÀûÀÎ ±â¾÷¸Å¼ö°¡ È°¹ßÇÏÁö ¾ÊÀº Å¿µµ ÀÖÁö¸¸, ÀÌ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Àû¹ý¼º°ú Ÿ´ç¼º¿¡ °üÇÑ ¹ý¿øÀÇ ÆÇ´ÜÀÌ ¸¹Áö ¾ÊÀ¸¸ç, »ó¹ýÀ̳ª Áõ±Ç°Å·¡¹ý µîµµ ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¼ö´ÜµéÀ» È°¿ëÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖÀ» ¸¸Å ź·ÂÀûÀÌÁö ¸øÇϱ⠶§¹®¿¡ Æ÷ÀÌÁð ÇÊÀº Àú·ÅÇÑ °¡°ÝÀ¸·Î ÁÖ½ÄÀ» ¸Å¼öÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ±ÇÇÑÀ» ¹è´çÀÇ ÇüÅ·ΠÁÖÁֵ鿡°Ô ºÎ¿©ÇÑ´Ù´Â °ÍÀÌ ÇÙ½É ³»¿ëÀÌ´Ù. ÇÏÁö¸¸ ÇöÇà »ó¹ý»ó Çö±Ý¹è´ç°ú ÁֽĹè´ç¸¸À» Çã¿ëÇÏ°í ÀÖ°í, ÄݿɼÇÀº ¹è´çÀÇ ÇüÅ·ΠÀÎÁ¤ÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù´Â ÇÑ°è°¡ ÀÖ´Ù. ±×µ¿¾È ÀÌ¿¡ °üÇÑ ³íÀÇ°¡ ±×¸® ¸¹Áö ¾Ê¾Ò´ø °ÍÀ¸·Î º¸ÀδÙ. |